Generic 4 x 4 two person games have at most 15 Nash equilibria
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
McLennan, A; Park, IU
署名单位：
University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Bristol
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1998.0640
发表日期：
1999
页码：
111-130
关键词：
摘要：
The maximal generic number of Nash equilibria for two person games in which the two agents each have four pure strategies is shown to be 15. In contrast to Keiding (1997), Games Econ. Behav. 21, 148-160, who arrives at this result by referring to the enumeration of Grunbaum and Sreedharan (1967), J. Combin. Theory 2, 437-465, our argument is based on a collection of lemmas that constrain the set of equilibria. Several of these pertain to any common number d of pure strategies for the two agents. Classification Number: C72. (C) 1999 Academic Press.