Iterated expectations and common priors
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Samet, D
署名单位：
Tel Aviv University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0616
发表日期：
1998
页码：
131-141
关键词：
摘要：
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior for several players is given in terms of the players' present belief; only. A common prior exists iff for each random variable it is common knowledge that all its iterated expectations converge to the same value; this value is its expectation with respect to the common prior. The proof is based on the presentation of type functions as Markov matrices. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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