Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Jehiel, P
署名单位：
Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; University of London; University College London
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0589
发表日期：
1998
页码：
274-298
关键词：
摘要：
This paper provides a learning justification for limited forecast equilibria, i.e., strategy profiles such that (1) players choose their actions in order to maximize the discounted average payoff over their horizon of foresight as given by their forecasts and (2) forecasts are correct on and off the equilibrium path. The limited forecast equilibria appear to be the stochastically stable outcomes of a simple learning process involving (vanishing) trembles. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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