Naive adaptive behavior and the observability of gambles
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Robson, AJ
署名单位：
Western University (University of Western Ontario)
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0609
发表日期：
1998
页码：
97-108
关键词：
摘要：
This paper considers a class of naive adaptive learning rules in a social setting. They generalize biological selection and have become relevant in economic theory as a consequence of their use in evolutionary game models. The environment considered here is nonstrategic but includes gambles which are more or less completely observed in each period. In the long run, individuals are more averse to a gamble which is less observable, other things being equal, and may violate first-order stochastic dominance. Thus these rules need not be consistent with rational behavior in the usual sense. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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