More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultimatum games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ruffle, BJ
署名单位：
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1997.0630
发表日期：
1998
页码：
247-265
关键词：
摘要：
This paper examines Allocators' willingness to reward and punish their paired Recipients. Recipients only compete in a skill-testing contest, the outcome of which determines the size of the surplus. In the dictator game, Allocators reward skillful Recipients, but punish unskillful ones only modestly. The punishment effect is mitigated by the belief held by some Allocators that effort is the appropriate measure of deservingness. The ultimatum game extension reveals offerers' ability to adapt to the strategic environment. Offers to skillful Recipients in the ultimatum game, however, are shown to be motivated by a taste for fairness, and not strategic considerations. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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