Divide-and-permute

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Thomson, W
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.009
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 186-200
• 关键词: Nash implementation; No-envy; divide-and-permute

摘要

We construct simple games implementing in Nash equilibria several solutions to the problem of fair division. These solutions are the no-envy solution, which selects the allocations such that no agent would prefer someone else's bundle to his own. and several variants of this solution, Components of strategies can be interpreted as allocations, consumption bundles, permutations, points in simplices of dimensionalities equal to the number of goods or to the number of agents, and integers, We also propose a simple game implementing the Pareto solution and games implementing the intersections of the Pareto solution with each of these solutions. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.