Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Meirowitz, A
• 署名单位: Princeton University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.015
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 464-489
• 关键词: downsian competition; ELECTIONS; signaling games; polling; Information revelation; voting theory

摘要

We investigate the incentives faced by poll respondents when candidates use polling data to inform their selection of policy platforms. Focusing on models with a unidimensional policy space, single peaked preferences and two office-seeking candidates observing a summary statistic from polls that ask respondents their preferences, we find that for most environments honest poll response cannot occur in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, simple partially-revealing equilibria exist when the poll only asks respondents which party or candidate they prefer. When the candidates learn the sample average or see all the data, there are partially revealing equilibria that mimic those of the binary message game. Interpretation of polling data requires knowledge of the equilibrium played as the meanings of poll responses are endogenously determined. The analysis suggests that naive use of polling data may be misleading. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.