Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aramendía, M; Larrea, C; Ruiz, L
• 署名单位: University of Basque Country
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.008
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1-19
• 关键词: infinitely repeated games; RENEGOTIATION; Cournot model

摘要

We explore a new concept of renegotiation proofness in the symmetric repeated Cournot model with several players. We show that this concept significantly limits the cooperative outcomes that can be sustained in equilibrium. In particular, the symmetric monopoly outcome cannot be sustained when the number of players is high enough (9 in the case of the linear demand function). When the number of players tends to infinity, (i) the collusive benefits that could be sustained are at most four times the Cournot benefits, and (ii) the reasonable price that can be sustained in equilibrium tends to the Cournot price. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.