Subjective reasoning - solutions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feinberg, Y
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.004
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 94-132
• 关键词: reasoning; epistemology rationality

摘要

The subjective framework is used to characterize the reasoning leading to an equilibrium refinement based on sequential rationality and Nash equilibrium in dynamic games. Equilibria based on sequential rationality require different reasoning on and off the equilibrium path for such solutions to emerge, or need arbitrary rules for reasoning depending on which game is played, We suggest a solution concept termed the reasonable solution based on maximization of confidence in rationality, equal treatment of the reasoning procedure at every decision point. confidence of this symmetry in the method of reasoning about others, and the use of the same reasoning principle by the modeler and the players. While not an equilibrium refinement. this concept generalizes the backward induction solution. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.