On combining implementable social choice rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benoit, Jean Pierre; Ok, Efe A.; Sanver, M. Rerazi
• 署名单位: New York University; Istanbul Bilgi University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.11.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 20-30
• 关键词: Nash implementation; Dominant strategy implementation; Maskin monotonicity; minimal monotonic extension; largest implementable subcorrespondence

摘要

We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. Our results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature; similarly, the intersection of Nash implementable SCCs need not be Nash implementable. On the other hand, we find that the union of any set of Nash implementable social choice rules is Nash implementable (for societies of at least three constituents). This last observation allows us to formulate the notion of the largest Nash implementable subcorrespondence of a social choice rule. (c) 2006 Published by Elsevier Inc.