Efficiency in coalition games with externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hafalir, Isa E.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.009
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 242-258
• 关键词: Coalition formation; externalities; Partition function games; Shapley value; implementation

摘要

A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.