The beauty of bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fu, Qiang; Lu, Jingfeng
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.05.006
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 146-161
• 关键词: Multiple-winner contests; Effort; replication; Increasing-return-to-scale; Uneven partition

摘要

This paper examines the variation in total effort expended by participants when prizes are awarded in a grand contest as opposed to a number of subcontests. When contestants are homogeneous, under a mild and plausible condition (regular contest technology), a grand contest generates more effort than any set of subcontests. When no restrictions are placed on the contest technology, the results further demonstrate an increasing-return-to-scale property such that each individual responds to a proportional increase in the number of contestants and the number of each prize by increasing individual effort. Therefore, when a collection of identical subcontests forms a grand contest, the total effort always increases and the grand contest leads to a higher rent-dissipation rate. Our results apply to a wide variety of competitive activities, such as high-profile sports (e.g., diving and gymnastics in the Olympic Games), the internal labor market and the quota system for public resource allocation. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.