On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Stamatopoulos, Giorgos; Tauman, Tami
• 署名单位: University of Crete; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.008
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 331-333
• 关键词: Cost-reducing innovation; Asymmetric firms; Fixed fee; auction

摘要

It is well known that selling licenses for the use of a cost-reducing innovation by auction yields a higher revenue compared to fixed fee in a symmetric Cournot industry. In this note we show that this result can be reversed in an asymmetric Cournot industry, i.e., the fixed fee policy can generate a strictly higher revenue than the auction policy in an industry where prior to the innovation firms are cost-asymmetric. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.