-
作者：De Sinopoli, Francesco; Pimienta, Carlos
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Verona
摘要：We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur a strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Taylor, Curtis R.; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：We present a theory of voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close, and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate. These findings suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences (e.g., through pre-election polls or expert forecasts) may undermine the democratic process. Our analysis reveals that if the distribution of political preferences ...
-
作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Schotter, Andrew
作者单位：New York University; New York University; Brown University
摘要：This paper presents experimental evidence that when individuals are about to make a given decision under risk, they are willing to pay for information on the likelihood that this decision is ex-post optimal, even if this information will not affect their decision. Our findings suggest that this demand for non-instrumental information is caused by what we refer to as a confidence effect: the desire to increase one's posterior belief by ruling out bad news, even when such news would have no effe...
-
作者：Kivetz, Gil; Tauman, Yair
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：The paper demonstrates that collusion in a private value first price auction is likely to occur even in a one shot interaction. The strategies of the colluding parties must be mixed since agreeing to submit a bid equal to the reservation price of the seller provides the incentive for that bidder to cheat on the designated winner. We deal with a complete information environment with arbitrary number of bidders. We characterize the sensible equilibrium outcome where the two bidders with the high...
-
作者：Page, Frank H., Jr.; Wooders, Myrna
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Modeling club structures as bipartite directed networks, we formulate the problem of club formation with multiple memberships as a noncooperative game of network formation and identify conditions on network formation rules and players network payoffs sufficient to guarantee that the game has a potential function. Our sufficient conditions require that each player choose freely and unilaterally those clubs he joins and also his activities within those clubs (subject to feasibility constraints)....
-
作者：Benhabib, Jess; Bisin, Alberto; Schotter, Andrew
作者单位：New York University
摘要：In this paper we elicit preferences for money-time pairs via experimental techniques. We estimate a general specification of discounting that nests exponential and hyperbolic discounting, as well as various forms of present bias, including quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We find that discount rates are high and decline with both delay and amount, as most of the previous literature. We also find clear evidence for present bias. When identifying the form of the present bias, little evidence for qu...
-
作者：Beigman, Eyal
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：The strategic behavior of legislators depends on the information available before and during the legislation process. It is well established in the literature that interested parties such as voters and agenda setters can influence the outcomes of the process through strategic manipulation when they are sufficiently informed. When only partial information on the individual and collective preference is revealed the question of manipulability boils down to how Much information must be revealed be...
-
作者：Voorneveld, Mark
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Tilburg University
摘要：In classical game theory, players have finitely many actions and evaluate outcomes of mixed strategies using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Allowing a larger, but countable, player set introduces phenomena that are impossible in finite games: Even if players have identical payoffs (no conflicts of interest), (I) this payoff may be minimized in dominant-strategy equilibria, and (2) games so alike that even the consequences of unilateral deviations are the same, may have disjoint se...
-
作者：Hummel, Patrick
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：I analyze mixed strategy equilibria in a Downsian model with two office-motivated candidates in which one candidate is endowed with a sufficiently large valence advantage that a voter might prefer this candidate even if the voter strictly prefers the other candidate's policies. There is a discrete one-dimensional policy space and the preferences of the median voter are uncertain. I show that there is a range of moderate policies with no gaps that are optimal for the advantaged candidate. There...
-
作者：Andersson, T.; Svensson, L. -G.; Yang, Z.
作者单位：Lund University; Yokohama National University
摘要：A number of jobs are to be assigned to a greater number of workers. While having to abide by the law of minimum wages, firms must determine who should be assigned which job and at what Salary. In Such situations fair (envy-free) allocations usually fail to exist. To cope with this Situation, this paper proposes a new concept of fairness, called constrained fairness. Among the set of constrainedly fair allocations, the so-called constrainedly fair and minimal allocations are of particular inter...
