Deterministic approximation of best-response dynamics for the Matching Pennies game
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gorodeisky, Ziv
署名单位：
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.013
发表日期：
2009
页码：
191-201
关键词：
摘要：
We consider stochastic dynamics for the Matching Pennies game, which behave, in expectation, like the best-response dynamics (i.e., the continuous fictitious play). Since the corresponding vector field is not continuous, we cannot apply the deterministic approximation results of Benaim and Weibull [M. Benaim, W. Weibull. 2003. Deterministic approximation of stochastic evolution in games. Econometrica 71, 873-903]. Nevertheless, we prove such results for our dynamics by developing the notion of a leading coordinate. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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