A sequential selection game with vetoes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alpern, Steve; Gal, Shmuel; Solan, Eilon
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; University of Haifa; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.05.006
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1-14

摘要

We study a selection game between two committee members (the players). They interview candidates sequentially and have to decide, after each interview, whether to hire the candidate or to interview the next candidate. Each player can either accept or reject the candidate, and if he rejects the candidate while the other accepts her, he can cast a veto. The candidate is hired if accepted by at least one player and not vetoed. The total number of vetoes available for each player are fixed in advance. We prove the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium if there are a finite number of candidates types. For a general candidate distribution we prove the existence of a subgame perfect epsilon-equilibrium. We exhibit situations in which a player prefers that the other player would have an extra veto, and even prefers to give one of his vetoes to the other player. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.