Optimal collusion with internal contracting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lee, Gea M.
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.005
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 646-669
• 关键词: Price-fixing collusion; private information; Internal contract; Information distortion

摘要

In this paper, two firms play an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game, and each firm has an agent who produces the firm's output and holds private information about production costs. The colluding firms fix prices and allocate market shares based on their agents' information. We develop a model of collusion in which firms use the presence of agents as a strategic opportunity to restrict their incentives to distort private information. We show that such firm behavior may expand the scope of optimal collusion whether market-allocation schemes are asymmetric or symmetric. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.