Secure implementation in allotment economies

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Bochet, Olivier; Sakai, Toyotaka
• 署名单位: Yokohama National University; Maastricht University; University of Bern
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.04.023
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 35-49
• 关键词: Secure implementation; strategy-proofness; Uniform rule; priority rule; Nash implementation; Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; Single-peaked preference; Fair allocation

摘要

An allocation rule is securely implementable if it is strategy-proof and has no bad Nash equilibrium in its associated direct revelation game [Saijo, T., Sjostrom, T., Yamato, T., 2007. Secure implementation. Theoretical Econ. 2, 203-229. Original work published in RIETI Discussion Paper (03-E-019), 2003]. We study this implementability notion in allotment economies with single-peaked preferences [Sprumont, Y., 1991. The division problem with single-peaked preferences: A characterization of the uniform allocation rule. Econometrica 59, 509-519]. The equal division rule and priority rules are characterized on the basis of secure implementability, which underlines a strong trade-off between efficiency and symmetry. Though the uniform rule is not securely implementable, we show that, in its direct revelation game, any bad Nash equilibrium is blocked by a credible coalitional deviation, and any good Nash equilibrium is never blocked. Thus the impossibility of securely implementing the uniform rule can be resolved by allowing pre-play communication among players. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.