On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Moreno, Diego; Shitovitz, Benyamin
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Hitotsubashi University; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.002
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 77-94
• 关键词: oligopoly; incomplete information; Bayesian; cournot; equilibrium; EXISTENCE; uniqueness

摘要

We show that when firms have incomplete information about the market demand and their costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we also find some sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More general results arise when negative prices are possible. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.