The efficiency and stability of R&D networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Koenig, Michael D.; Battiston, Stefano; Napoletano, Mauro; Schweitzer, Frank
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Stanford University; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Universite Cote d'Azur; SKEMA Business School
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.007
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 694-713
• 关键词: R&D networks; Knowledge recombination; Indirect spillovers; Network efficiency; network formation

摘要

We investigate the efficiency and stability of R&D networks in a model with network-dependent indirect spillovers. We show that the efficient network structure critically depends on the marginal cost of R&D collaborations. When the marginal cost is low, the complete graph is efficient, while high marginal costs imply that the efficient network is asymmetric and has a nested structure. Regarding the stability of network structures, we show the existence of both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. The efficient network is stable for small industry size and small cost. In contrast, for large industry size, there is a wide region of cost in which the efficient network is not stable. This implies a divergence between efficiency and stability in large industries. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.