The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schmitz, Patrick W.; Troeger, Thomas
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.002
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 651-665
• 关键词: Majority rule; mechanism design; correlated values; Utilitarianism

摘要

We consider collective choice from two alternatives. Ex-ante, each agent is uncertain about which alternative she prefers, and may be uncertain about the intensity of her preferences. An environment is given by a probability distribution over utility vectors that is symmetric across agents and neutral across alternatives. In many environments, the majority voting rule maximizes agents' ex-ante expected utilities among all anonymous and dominant-strategy implementable choice rules. But in some environments where the agents' utilities are stochastically correlated, other dominant-strategy choice rules are better for all agents. If utilities are stochastically independent across agents, majority voting is ex-ante optimal among all anonymous and incentive-compatible rules. We also compare rules from an interim-viewpoint. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.