Strategy-proof partitioning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mishra, Debasis; Roy, Souvik
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Universite de Caen Normandie
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.004
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 285-300
• 关键词: Strategy-proof partitioning; Meet social choice function; Intermediate domain

摘要

We consider the problem of choosing a partition of a set of objects by a set of agents. The private information of each agent is a strict ordering over the set of partitions of the objects. A social choice function chooses a partition given the reported preferences of the agents. We impose a natural restriction on the allowable set of strict orderings over the set of partitions, which we call an intermediate domain. Our main result is a complete characterization of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions in the intermediate domain. We also show that a social choice function is strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if it is a meet social choice function. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.