On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel-fringe game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benchekroun, Hassan; Withagen, Cees
• 署名单位: McGill University; Universite de Montreal; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.008
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 355-374
• 关键词: Cartel-fringe; Dominant firm versus fringe; Price taking; nonrenewable resources; dynamic games; Open-loop versus closed-loop strategies

摘要

We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel-fringe game a la Salant, 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large, the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop Nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop cartel-fringe game. Thus, the outcome of the cartel-fringe open-loop equilibrium can be supported as an outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. However the interpretation of the cartel-fringe model, where from the outset the fringe is assumed to be price taker, as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly with the agents playing Nash-Cournot, does not extend to the case where firms can use closed-loop strategies. (C) 2012 Published by Elsevier Inc.