Admissibility and event-rationality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barelli, Paulo; Galanis, Spyros
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; University of Southampton
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.012
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 21-40
• 关键词: Epistemic game theory; Admissibility; Iterated weak dominance; common knowledge; rationality; completeness

摘要

We develop an approach to providing epistemic conditions for admissible behavior in games. Instead of using lexicographic beliefs to capture infinitely less likely conjectures, we postulate that players use tie-breaking sets to help decide among strategies that are outcome-equivalent given their conjectures. A player is event-rational if she best responds to a conjecture and uses a list of subsets of the other players' strategies to break ties among outcome-equivalent strategies. Using type spaces to capture interactive beliefs, we show that event-rationality and common belief of event-rationality (RCBER) imply S-infinity W, the set of admissible strategies that survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies. By strengthening standard belief to validated belief, we show that event-rationality and common validated belief of event-rationality (RCvBER) imply IA, the iterated admissible strategies. We show that in complete, continuous and compact type structures, RCBER and RCvBER are nonempty, hence providing epistemic criteria for S-infinity W and IA. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.