A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Athanasiou, Efthymios
• 署名单位: New Economic School
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 369-387
• 关键词: Indivisible private good; Quasi-linear preferences; strategy-proofness; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

摘要

A benevolent Planner wishes to assign an indivisible private good to n claimants, each valuing the object differently. Individuals have quasi-linear preferences. Therefore, the possibility of transfers is allowed. A second-best efficient mechanism is a strategy-proof and anonymous mechanism that is not Pareto dominated by another strategy-proof and anonymous mechanism. In this context, we identify three conditions that are necessary and, together with Voluntary Participation, sufficient for a mechanism to be second-best efficient. This set includes mechanisms that destroy the good at certain profiles. For domains comprising two individuals we provide an explicit characterization of the family of second-best efficient mechanisms. (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc.