Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pancs, Romans
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 522-543
• 关键词: Sequential negotiations; Buy-now price; Strategic bid disclosure

摘要

Negotiations about a merger or acquisition are often sequential and only partially disclose to bidders information about each other's bids. This paper explains the seller optimality of partial disclosure in a single-item private-value auction with two bidders. Each bidder can inspect the item at a nonprohibitive cost. If a revenue-maximizing seller cannot charge bidders for the information about the other's bid, then the seller optimally runs a sequential second-price auction with a reserve price and a buy-now price. The seller prefers to keep the bids confidential and, sometimes, to hide the order in which he approaches the bidders. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.