Cooperation, imitation and partial rematching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rivas, Javier
• 署名单位: University of Leicester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.011
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 148-162
• 关键词: cooperation; Partial rematching; imitation; prisoner's dilemma

摘要

We study a setting in which imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisoner's Dilemma game. A well-known result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we consider partial rematching: players that belong to a pair in which both parties cooperate repeat partner next period, while all other players are randomly matched into pairs. Under certain conditions, this rematching mechanism makes cooperation the unique outcome in the long run. Furthermore, we show that if imitation happens infrequently enough then cooperative behavior is always present in the population. (c) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.