Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Creane, Anthony; Ko, Chiu Yu; Konishi, Hideo
• 署名单位: University of Kentucky; National University of Singapore; Boston College
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.013
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 254-268
• 关键词: licensing; Technology transfer

摘要

We examine a firm that can license its production technology to a rival when firms are heterogeneous in production costs. We show that a complete technology transfer from one firm to another always increases joint profit under weakly concave demand when at least three firms remain in the industry. A jointly profitable transfer may reduce social welfare, although a jointly profitable transfer from the most efficient firm always increases welfare. We also consider two auction games under complete information: a standard first-price auction and a menu auction by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). With natural refinement of equilibria, we show that the resulting licensees are ordered by degree of efficiency: menu auction, simple auction, and joint-profit-maximizing licensees, in (weakly) descending order. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.