Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Juarez, Ruben
• 署名单位: University of Hawaii System
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.005
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 218-239
• 关键词: cost sharing; mechanism design; Group strategyproof; Tie-breaking rule

摘要

Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of a good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (MAX) an indifferent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (MIN) an indifferent agent does not get a unit of the good. GSP and MAX characterize the cross-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever symmetry is required. On the other hand, GSP and MIN characterize the sequential mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever there is scarcity of the good. Our results are independent of an underlying cost function; they unify and strengthen earlier results for particular classes of cost functions. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.