Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Triossi, Matteo
• 署名单位: Universidad de Chile
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.008
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 169-191
• 关键词: Endogenous information acquisition; Heterogeneity; Condorcet's Jury Theorem

摘要

This paper presents a strategic model of common value elections with endogenous information acquisition. It proves that majoritarian elections can fail to aggregate information when voters have heterogeneous skills and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for information aggregation. Inefficiencies can be partially corrected by limiting participation to the most competent citizens, a result which provides a rational foundation for epistocratic government. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.