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作者：Garrett, Daniel F.
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We consider a model of cost-based procurement in which the principal faces Knightian uncertainty about the agent's preferences for cost reduction. We show that a particularly simple incentive scheme a menu comprising a fixed-price contract and a cost-reimbursement contract minimizes the maximum expected payment, where this maximum is taken over the set of possible agent preferences. For some parameters of the problem, a range of alternative incentive schemes also satisfy this criterion. We sho...
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作者：Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moulin, Herve
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; University of Glasgow
摘要：We ask how to share the cost of finitely many public goods (items) among users with different needs: some smaller subsets of items are enough to serve the needs of each user, yet the cost of all items must be covered, even if this entails inefficiently paying for redundant items. Typical examples are network connectivity problems when an existing (possibly inefficient) network must be maintained. We axiomatize a family cost ratios based on simple liability indices, one for each agent and for e...
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作者：Karos, Dominik
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：An apex game consists of one apex player and a set of minor players. We identify two key properties of apex games and use them to introduce the class of general apex games. We derive players' preferences over winning coalitions by applying strongly monotonic power indices on such a game and all its subgames and investigate whether there are core stable coalitions in the induced hedonic coalition formation game. Besides several general results, in particular, we develop conditions on the game f...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Sourav; Duffya, John; Kim, Sun-Tak
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National Taiwan University
摘要：We report on an experiment comparing compulsory and voluntary voting institutions in a voting game with common preferences. Rational choice theory predicts sharp differences in voter behavior between these two institutions. If voting is compulsory, then voters may find it rational to vote insincerely, i.e., against their private information. If voting is voluntary so that abstention is allowed, then sincere voting in accordance with a voter's private information is always rational while partic...
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作者：Kawai, Keiichi
作者单位：University of Queensland
摘要：We analyze a dynamic market for lemons in which the quality of the good is endogenously determined by the seller. Potential buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. The seller can make an investment that determines the quality of the item at the of the game, which is unobservable to buyers. At the interim stage of the game, the information and payoff structures are the same as in the market for lemons. Our main result is that the possibility of trade does not create any efficiency gain...
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作者：Liu, Heng
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：This note considers equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions with two bidders. We show that for each ex post equilibrium in continuous and undominated strategies, a sequence of almost common-value auctions can be constructed such that each of them possesses a unique undominated and continuous equilibrium and the corresponding sequence of equilibria converges to that ex post equilibrium. As an implication, no equilibrium selection of this model based on perturbations seems to...
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作者：Drouvelis, Michalis; Saporiti, Alejandro; Vriend, Nicolaas J.
作者单位：University of Birmingham; University of Manchester; University of London
摘要：We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations, called 'one-sided' and 'probabilistic' policy different...
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作者：Boyarchenko, Svetlana; Levendorskii, Sergei
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Leicester
摘要：We study a stochastic version of Fudenberg-Tirole's preemption game. Two firms contemplate entering a new market with stochastic demand. Firms differ in sunk costs of entry. If the demand process has no upward jumps, the low cost firm enters first, and the high cost firm follows. If leader's optimization problem has an interior solution, the leader enters at the optimal threshold of a monopolist; otherwise, the leader enters earlier than the monopolist. If the demand admits positive jumps, the...
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作者：Holzman, Ron; Samet, Dov
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Tel Aviv University
摘要：When men and women are objectively ranked in a marriage problem, say by beauty, then pairing individuals of equal rank is the only stable matching. We generalize this observation by providing bounds on the size of the rank gap between mates in a stable matching in terms of the size of the ranking sets. Using a metric on the set of matchings, we provide bounds on the diameter of the core - the set of stable matchings - in terms of the size of the ranking sets and in terms of the size of the ran...
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作者：Palvolgyi, Denes; Peters, Hans; Vermeulen, Dries
作者单位：Corvinus University Budapest; Maastricht University
摘要：The classical bankruptcy problem is extended by assuming that there are multiple estates. In the finite estate case, the agents have homogeneous preferences per estate, which may differ across estates. In the more general infinite estate problem, players have arbitrary preferences over an interval of real numbers each of which is regarded as an estate. A strategic estate game is formulated in which each agent distributes his legal entitlement over the estates, resulting in individual claims pe...
