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作者：Ben-Porath, Elchanan
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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作者：Feldman, Michal; Leyton-Brown, Kevin
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of British Columbia
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作者：Burchardi, Konrad B.; Penczynski, Stefan P.
作者单位：Stockholm University; University of Mannheim
摘要：We experimentally investigate the fundamental element of the level-k model of reasoning, the level-0 actions and beliefs. We use data from a novel experimental design that allows us to obtain incentivised written accounts of individuals' reasoning. In particular, these accounts allow to infer level-0 beliefs. Level-0 beliefs are not significantly different from 50, and almost 60% of higher level players start their reasoning from a level-0 belief of exactly 50. We also estimate that around one...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Samet, Dov
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Interpersonal consistency can be described in epistemic terms as a property of beliefs, or in economic terms as the impossibility of certain trades. The existence of a common prior from which all agents' beliefs are derived is of the first kind. The non-existence of an agreeable bet, that is, a contingent zero-sum trade which is always favorable to all agents, is of the second kind. It is well established that these two notions of consistency are equivalent for finite type spaces but not for c...
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作者：Ozyurt, Selcuk
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：In crisis bargaining literature, it is conventional wisdom that the ability of generating higher audience costs is an advantage for a leader of a state. However, empirical studies show that democratic states use this mechanism only occasionally. This paper formally shows that higher audience costs may be good or bad depending on (1) the benefit-cost ratio of the crisis, (2) initial probability of resolve, and (3) how fast states generate audience costs with time. In particular, if the value of...
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作者：Kanatas, George; Stefanadis, Christodoulos
作者单位：Rice University; University of Piraeus
摘要：We examine implications of a society's cultural emphasis on moral sentiments. Entrepreneurs and investors interact in a game that entails both adverse selection and moral hazard; entrepreneurs may attempt to breach their contracts and expropriate investors. An agent is born into a particular culture but chooses whether to develop a moral conscience and thereby subject himself to moral sentiments. In equilibrium, societies that place less emphasis on guilt exhibit a lower risk of expropriation ...
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作者：Gradwohl, Ronen; Reingold, Omer
作者单位：Northwestern University; Microsoft; Weizmann Institute of Science
摘要：A Nash equilibrium is an optimal strategy for each player under the assumption that others play according to their respective Nash strategies, but it provides no guarantees in the presence of irrational players or coalitions of colluding players. In fact, no such guarantees exist in general. However, in this paper we show that large games are innately fault tolerant. We quantify the ways in which two subclasses of large games - lambda-continuous games and anonymous games - are resilient agains...
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作者：Satterthwaite, Mark A.; Williams, Steven R.; Zachariadis, Konstantinos E.
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers. Traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and asks from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a market-clearing price. It fails to achieve all possible gains from trade because of strategic bidding. The designed mechanism is a revelation mechanism in which honest reporting of values/costs is incentiv...
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作者：Heinsalu, Sander
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in standard games. A natural question is whether each hierarchy describes the player's awareness of the hierarchies of other players and beliefs over these, or whether the reasoning can continue indefinitely. This paper constructs the universal type structure with unawareness where each type has an awareness level and a belief over types. Countable hierarchies are therefore sufficient...
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作者：Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided one's initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high...
