Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hummel, Patrick
• 署名单位: Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.005
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 85-102
• 关键词: Policy selection; Primary elections; General elections; Candidate valence

摘要

I consider a model in which candidates of differing quality must win a primary election to compete in the general election. I show that there is an equilibrium in which Democrats choose liberal policies and Republicans choose conservative policies, but higher quality candidates choose more moderate policies than lower quality candidates. In this equilibrium, higher quality candidates choose more moderate policies if they have a larger quality advantage or there is less uncertainty about the median voter's ideal point in the general election, and the candidates in a given primary choose closer policies to one another when there is a smaller quality difference between the candidates in a primary. I further show that if the candidates have policy motivations, then a low quality candidate may strategically choose to enter a primary even if running for office is costly and the candidate will lose the primary election with certainty in equilibrium. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.