Imposing commitment to rein in overconfidence in learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel; Mayskaya, Tatiana; Nikandrova, Arina
• 署名单位: Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE); University of Nevada Reno; Johns Hopkins University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); City St Georges, University of London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.001
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 29-48
• 关键词: Learning; DELEGATION; overconfidence; Misspecified model

摘要

A rational principal delegates learning to an overconfident agent who overestimates the precision of the information he collects. The principal chooses between two contracts: commitment, in which the agent commits to the duration of learning in advance, and flexible, in which the agent decides when to stop learning in real time. When the agent is sufficiently overconfident, the principal optimally ties the agent's hands by offering him the commitment contract. When the principal can choose both the contract and the agent's level of overconfidence, selecting the rational agent is suboptimal when the cost of learning is sufficiently high.