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作者：Wong, Tsz-Ning; Yang, Lily Ling; Zhao, Xin
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Mannheim; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We consider a model of collective persuasion, in which members of an advisory committee with private continuous signals vote on a policy change. A decision maker then decides whether to adopt the change upon observing each vote. Information transmission between the committee and the decision maker is possible if and only if there exists an informative equilibrium in which the decision maker only adopts the policy change after a unanimous vote. Similarly, full information aggregation is achieva...
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作者：Leduc, Mathieu V.
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：This article proposes a dynamic model to examine the structure of simple relational contracts, obeying realistic properties that can be easily understood and audited by both parties. In such relationships, the need to offer each supplier a large enough share of future business to deter cheating limits the number of relationships a buyer can sustain. Trade is thus restricted to durable relationships, a form of social capital. Nevertheless, exogenous stochastic shocks sometimes prevent suppliers...
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作者：Catonini, Emiliano; Kurbatov, Andrey; Stepanov, Sergey
作者单位：New York University; NYU Shanghai; INSEAD Business School; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We consider the problem of a decision-maker who seeks for advice from several experts. The experts have reputation concerns which generate incentives to herd on the prior belief about the state of the world. We address the following question: Should the experts be allowed to exchange their information before providing advice (collective expertise) or not (independent expertise)? We show that collective expertise is more informative than independent expertise under low prior uncertainty about t...
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作者：Chu, Yinxiao
作者单位：Huazhong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We study a sequential trading mechanism with ambiguity-averse agents modeled by multiple prior preferences. Informed traders generally mix between trading and non-trading, and their trading probability decreases with ambiguity. If agents are sufficiently ambiguous, informed traders do not trade, and only noise traders place orders; trading becomes uninformative. When signal accuracy is ambiguous, trading can make public beliefs more ambiguous over time, which leads to social learning failures ...
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作者：Bester, Helmut
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders' fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium, independently of the traders' inequity aversion. Fairness may yield a Pareto improvem...
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作者：Moscariello, Paola
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：I explain puzzles in the school assignment literature using a many -to -one matching model in which participants on one side of the market, the students, are endowed with ego -utilities & agrave; la K & ouml;szegi (2006). Ego concerns generate a form of information avoidance that results in nontruthful participation in DA matching mechanisms. In particular, students' best replies may be non -monotonic in school ranks. I show that truthful reporting can be restored by imposing a limit on the me...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Hu, Gaoji
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper extends the Bayesian stability notion of Liu (2020) to define the Bayesian stability of a market state , which consists of a matching outcome and an information structure. The information structure can be arbitrarily heterogeneous and can accommodate learning among agents. We first establish that a Bayesian stable matching function of Liu (2020) can be recast as Bayesian stable market states with homogeneous information. We then illustrate the usefulness of such an extension by (i) ...
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作者：Khandelwal, Vatsal
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Individuals update their beliefs and respond to new information in idiosyncratic ways. I show that an individual's idiosyncrasies such as under -reaction, over -reaction, or frustration can have spillover effects and adversely affect the long run beliefs of society. I derive sufficient conditions for convergence of beliefs for all possible networks of agents with heterogeneous idiosyncrasies. Beliefs converge if the magnitude of over -reaction and frustration in any agent's network neighbourho...
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作者：Rheingans-Yoo, Ross
摘要：I present a class of models for random matching markets with non -homogeneous agent preferences, drawn from the computer science literature on network structure. An analogue of the Watts-Strogatz (1998) 'small -world' network model supports significant incentives to manipulate matching outcomes. The scope for manipulation remains substantial as markets become large and unbalanced-contrasting prior work which found little scope under uniform or homogeneous random preferences. This scope for man...
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作者：Sethi, Ravideep; Yoo, Wonseok
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：We consider non-cooperative bargaining over a fixed surplus between two groups that may differ in size and the supermajority threshold they employ for within-group ratification. We find that total allocation to a group does not depend on group size and increases with the supermajority threshold. We use the Gini coefficient to study within-group inequality as an outcome of interest and find that inequality increases with group size and decreases with the supermajority threshold. Finally, we stu...
