Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Gallo, Oihane; Vorsatz, Marc
• 署名单位: Universidad Publica de Navarra; Universidad Publica de Navarra; University of Lausanne; Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia (UNED)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.011
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 107-127
• 关键词: Social choice rule; strategy-proofness; single-peaked preferences; Single-dipped preferences

摘要

We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result characterizes all strategy-proof rules and shows that they can be decomposed into two steps. In the first step, the agents with single-peaked preferences are asked about their peaks and, for each profile of reported peaks, at most two alternatives are preselected. In the second step, the agents with single-dipped preferences are asked to reveal their dips to complete the decision between the preselected alternatives. Our result generalizes the findings of Moulin (1980) and Barber & agrave; and Jackson (1994) for single-peaked and of Manjunath (2014) for single-dipped preferences. Finally, we show that all strategy-proof rules are also group strategy- proof and analyze the implications of Pareto efficiency.