Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Bo; Chen, Bo
• 署名单位: Shenzhen University; Southern Methodist University; Hubei University of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.010
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 204-222
• 关键词: All-pay auction; Contest; Bayesian persuasion; information disclosure; interdependent valuations

摘要

We study all-pay auctions with one-sided private information and interdependent valuations. To sharpen the competition and maximize revenue, the auction organizer can design an information disclosure policy through Bayesian persuasion about the bidder with private information. We characterize optimal disclosure and find that optimal disclosure exhibits almost full disclosure, where the uninformed bidder can always narrow the informed bidder's private information down to at most two types. We also illustrate our characterization in a simple binary-type setting and investigate issues such as comparative statics, welfare, and efficiency.