Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, Duk Gyoo; Lim, Wooyoung
• 署名单位: Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.013
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 59-76
• 关键词: Multilateral bargaining; Loss division; laboratory experiments

摘要

Many-player divide-the-dollar (DD) games have been a workhorse in the theoretical and experimental analysis of multilateral bargaining. If we deal with a loss or consider many-player divide-the-penalty (DP) games, the theoretical predictions are not simply those from DD games with the sign flipped. We show that the stationary stage-undominated equilibrium (SSUE) is no longer unique in payoffs. The most egalitarian equilibrium among the stationary equilibria is a mirror image of the essentially unique SSUE in the Baron-Ferejohn model. That equilibrium's allocations are sensitive to changes in parameters, while the most unequal equilibrium is less affected by such changes. Experimental evidence supports the most unequal equilibrium: Most of the approved proposals under a majority rule involve an extreme allocation of the loss to a few members. Other observations such as no delay, the proposer advantage, and the acceptance rate are also consistent with predictions based on the most unequal equilibrium.