Informational externalities and emergence of consensus (vol 66, pg 979, 2009)
成果类型：
Correction
署名作者：
Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
署名单位：
Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.009
发表日期：
2024
页码：
395-396
关键词：
摘要：
Rosenberg et al. (2009) studied the convergence of equilibrium behavior to consensus in social networks. In this corrigendum, we correct the condition required for one of their results to hold.
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