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作者：Muto, Nozomu
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：This paper studies a machine (finite automaton) playing a two-player repeated game of a simple extensive-form game with perfect information. We introduce a new complexity measure called multiple complexity which incorporates a strategy's responsiveness to information in the stage game as well as the number of states of the machine. We completely characterize the Nash equilibrium of the machine game. In the sequential-move prisoner's dilemma, cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium. (C) ...
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作者：Eil, David; Lien, Jaimie W.
作者单位：George Mason University; Tsinghua University
摘要：Frequent online poker players with extensive experience calculating probabilities and expected values might be expected to behave as Expected Utility maximizers, in that small shocks to their wealth would not affect risk preferences (Rabin, 2000). By contrast, reference-dependent loss aversion (as in Prospect Theory) (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) predicts that risk aversion decreases as wealth moves away from the reference point in either direction. In terms of continui...
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作者：Aiba, Katsuhiko
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We prove a folk theorem for stochastic games with private, almost-perfect monitoring and observable states when the limit set of feasible and individually rational payoffs is independent of the state. This asymptotic state independence holds, for example, for irreducible stochastic games. Our result establishes that the sophisticated construction of Horner and Olszewski (2006) for repeated games can be adapted to stochastic games, reinforcing our conviction that much knowledge and intuition ab...
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作者：Balkenborg, Dieter; Vermeulen, Dries
作者单位：University of Exeter; Maastricht University
摘要：We show that Nash equilibrium components are universal for the collection of connected polyhedral sets. More precisely for every polyhedral set we construct a so-called binary game-a game where all players have two pure strategies and a common utility function with values either zero or one-whose success set (the set of strategy profiles where the maximal payoff of one is indeed achieved) is homeomorphic to the given polyhedral set. Since compact semi-algebraic sets can be triangulated, a simi...
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作者：Wu, Binzhen; Zhong, Xiaohan
作者单位：Tsinghua University
摘要：We compare competing college admission matching mechanisms that differ in preference submission timing (pre-exam, post-exam but pre-score, or post-score) and in matching procedure (Boston (BOS) and serial dictatorship (SD) matching). Pre-exam submission asks students to submit college preferences before entrance exam scores are known, whereas post-score (post-exam) submission removes (reduces) score uncertainties. Theoretical analyses show that although mechanisms with post-score submission or...
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作者：Cabrales, Antonio; Gottardi, Piero
作者单位：University of London; University College London; European University Institute; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable - cheap talk messages - hence the quality of the information transmitted depends on the conflicts of interest faced by the senders. We find that, when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation compo...
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作者：Levine, David K.
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Makarov, Uliana
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one sender and multiple receivers. We study the change in equilibrium behavior from the addition of another audience as well as from varying the degree of conflict between the sender's and receivers' preferences. We find that, as in cheap talk games with just one receiver, information transmission is higher in games with a separating equilibrium, than in games with only a babbling equi...
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作者：Casella, Alessandra; Turban, Sebastien
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study the competitive equilibrium of a market for votes where the choice is binary and it is known that a majority of the voters supports one of the two alternatives. Voters can trade votes for a numeraire before making a decision via majority rule. We identify a sufficient condition guaranteeing the existence of an ex ante equilibrium. In equilibrium, only the most intense voter on each side demands votes, and each demands enough votes to alone control a majority. The equilibrium strongly ...
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作者：Cabral, Luis; Ozbay, Erkut Y.; Schotter, Andrew
作者单位：New York University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; New York University
摘要：In the context of an indefinitely repeated veto game, we devise an experiment to distinguish between alternative explanations of generous behavior (accepting negative payoffs): altruism, intrinsic backward-looking reciprocity, and instrumental forward-looking reciprocity. Our results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that observed sacrifices are motivated by equilibrium selfish, forward-looking reciprocal behavior although we find a more subtle way in which past kindness affects behav...
