Matching mechanisms and matching quality: Evidence from a top university in China

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wu, Binzhen; Zhong, Xiaohan
• 署名单位: Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.009
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 196-215
• 关键词: School choice; Matching quality; College admission; Boston matching; Serial dictatorship matching

摘要

We compare competing college admission matching mechanisms that differ in preference submission timing (pre-exam, post-exam but pre-score, or post-score) and in matching procedure (Boston (BOS) and serial dictatorship (SD) matching). Pre-exam submission asks students to submit college preferences before entrance exam scores are known, whereas post-score (post-exam) submission removes (reduces) score uncertainties. Theoretical analyses show that although mechanisms with post-score submission or SD matching are ex-post fair and efficient, they are not so ex-ante. Instead, the mechanism with pre-exam submission and BOS matching can be more fair and efficient ex-ante. These hypotheses are supported by empirical test on data from a top school at a top-ranked Chinese university with identification based on temporal and provincial changes. We find that although students admitted under the pre-exam BOS mechanism have lower college entrance exam scores than students admitted through other mechanisms on average, they exhibit similar or even better college academic performance. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.