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作者：Aperjis, Christina; Zeckhauser, Richard J.; Miao, Yali
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Reputations often guide sequential decisions to trust and to reward trust. We consider situations where each player is randomly matched with a partner in every period. One player the truster decides whether to trust. If trusted, the other player - the temptee - has a temptation to betray. The strength of temptation, private information to the temptee, varies across encounters. Betrayals are recorded as publicly known black marks. First, we identify equilibria when players only condition on the...
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作者：Chade, Hector; Vera de Serio, Virginia N.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University Nacional Cuyo Mendoza
摘要：We analyze how the agent's initial wealth affects the principal's expected profits in the standard principal-agent model with moral hazard. We show that if the principal prefers a poorer agent for all specifications of action sets, probability distributions, and disutility of effort, then the agent's utility of income must exhibit a coefficient of absolute prudence less than three times the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for all levels of income, thus strengthening the sufficiency resul...
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作者：Shapiro, Dmitry; Shi, Xianwen; Zillante, Artie
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Charlotte; University of Toronto
摘要：We study how the predictive power of level-k models changes as we perturb the classical beauty contest setting along two dimensions: the strength of the coordination motive and the information symmetry. We use a variation of the Morris and Shin (2002) model as the unified framework for our study, and find that the predictive power of level-k models varies considerably along these two dimensions. Level-k models are successful in predicting subject behavior in settings with symmetric information...
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作者：Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kuebler, Dorothea; Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW); Max Planck Society; Technical University of Berlin; Maastricht University
摘要：This paper studies the implementation of quotas in matching markets. In a controlled laboratory environment, we compare the performance of two university admissions procedures that both initially reserve a significant fraction of seats at each university for a special subgroup of students. The first mechanism mimics the sequential procedure currently used by the central clearinghouse for university admissions in Germany. This procedure starts by allocating reserved seats among eligible student...
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作者：Trockel, Walter
作者单位：Istanbul Bilgi University; University of Bielefeld
摘要：First via a counter example it is shown that Proposition 3 of Anbarci and Sun (2013) is false. Then a gap and a mistake in their proof are identified. Finally, a modified version of their Proposition 3 is stated and proved. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kotowski, Maciej H.; Rachmilevitch, Shiran
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Haifa
摘要：We clarify the sufficient condition for a trivial equilibrium to exist in the model of Rachmilevitch (2013). (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：University of Cyprus
摘要：We demonstrate that the Hotelling Downs model with runoff voting always admits symmetric mixed strategy equilibria for any (even or odd) number of office-motivated candidates (provided they are at least four). In specific, (a) we show that the game does not admit any symmetric atomless equilibrium, (b) we fully characterize a class of symmetric atomic mixed equilibria which exist for any distribution of the voters' ideal policies and (c) we argue that these equilibria are more robust than pure...
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作者：Andersson, Tommy; Gudmundsson, Jens; Talman, Dolf; Yang, Zaifu
作者单位：Lund University; Tilburg University; University of York - UK
摘要：A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up any existing partnerships or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the e...
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作者：Ockenfels, Axel; Selten, Reinhard
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Bonn
摘要：One striking behavioral phenomenon is the pull-to-center bias in the newsvendor game: facing stochastic demand, subjects tend to order quantities between the expected profit maximizing quantity and mean demand. We show that the impulse balance equilibrium, which is based on a simple ex-post rationality principle along with an equilibrium condition, predicts the pull-to-center bias and other, more subtle observations in the laboratory newsvendor game. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kotowski, Maciej H.; Li, Fei
作者单位：Harvard University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibriu...
