A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aiba, Katsuhiko
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.007
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 58-66
• 关键词: Stochastic games; private monitoring; folk theorem

摘要

We prove a folk theorem for stochastic games with private, almost-perfect monitoring and observable states when the limit set of feasible and individually rational payoffs is independent of the state. This asymptotic state independence holds, for example, for irreducible stochastic games. Our result establishes that the sophisticated construction of Horner and Olszewski (2006) for repeated games can be adapted to stochastic games, reinforcing our conviction that much knowledge and intuition about repeated games carries over to the analysis of irreducible stochastic games. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.