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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Naroditskiy, Victor; Polukarov, Maria; Greenwald, Amy; Jennings, Nicholas R.
作者单位：Brown University; University of Southampton; Brown University; King Abdulaziz University
摘要：We study the problem of allocating m identical items among n > m agents with unit demand and private value for consuming the good. We allow payments and focus on dominant-strategy implementation. In the absence of an auctioneer who can absorb payments collected from the agents, the payments must be burnt to support dominant-strategy implementation. Recent work modified the classic VCG mechanism by redistributing as much of the payments as possible back to the agents while still satisfying ince...
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作者：Jain, Shaili; Chen, Yiling; Parkes, David C.
作者单位：Yale University; Harvard University
摘要：We provide a game-theoretic model of sequential information aggregation motivated by online question-and-answer forums. An asker posts a question and each user decides when to aggregate a unique piece of information with existing information. When the quality exceeds a certain threshold, the asker closes the question and allocates points to users. We consider the effect of different rules for allocating points on the equilibrium behavior. A best-answer rule provides a unique, efficient equilib...
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作者：Rachmilevitch, Shiran
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidder's valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. Under certain distributional assumptions, the following holds: for every is an element of > 0 there is a nondegenerate interval Delta(is an element of) subset of (0, 1), such that if the bidders' discount factor belongs to Delta(is an element of), ...
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作者：Camargo, Braz
摘要：In an individual experimentation problem a decision maker learns only from his own experience. It is well known that an optimal experimentation strategy for such problems sometimes results in the best alternative being dropped altogether, which is the so-called Rothschild effect. Many experimentation problems of interest, however, involve learning from both individual experience and the experience of others. This paper shows that learning in society can overcome the Rothschild effect. We consi...
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作者：Dubovik, Andrei; Parakhonyak, Alexei
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We consider a dynamic competition game involving three players, in which each player can vary the extent of his competition on a per-rival basis. We call such competition targeted. We show that if the players are myopic, then the weaker players eventually lose the game to their strongest rival. If instead the players are sufficiently far-sighted, then all three players converge in their power and stay in the game. We develop our model in application to drug wars, but the approach of targeted c...
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作者：Eyster, Erik; Galeotti, Andrea; Kartik, Navin; Rabin, Matthew
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Essex; Columbia University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study observational learning in environments with congestion costs: an agent's payoff from choosing an action decreases as more predecessors choose that action. Herds cannot occur if congestion on every action can get so large that an agent prefers a different action regardless of his beliefs about the state. To the extent that switching away from the more popular action reveals private information, it improves learning. The absence of herding does not guarantee complete (asymptotic) learni...
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作者：Kos, Nenad
作者单位：Bocconi University
摘要：We examine a model of limited communication in which the seller is selling a single good to two potential buyers. In each of the finite number of periods the seller asks one of the two buyers a binary question. After the final answer, the allocation and the transfers are executed. The model sheds light on the communication protocols that arise in welfare maximizing mechanisms. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Vasconcelos, Luis
作者单位：University of Essex; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：I analyze a model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. The asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties. I show that contractual signaling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible. This conflict generates inefficient equilibria in terms of investment. Contracting on exclusivity in addition to quantity resolves the conflict and consequently eliminates the inefficiency of investment. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc...
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作者：Lima, Rafael Costa; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：In a seminal paper, Grossman and Helpman (1994) introduced a framework to understand how lobbying influences the choice of import/export tariffs. In this paper we extend their analysis and assume that lobbies have private information to analyze the effects of information transmission in a Grossman and Helpman lobby game. Information transmission leads to two agency costs. One refers to the cost of signaling and the other to the cost of screening the lobby's competitiveness. The signaling cost ...
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作者：Goldberg, Paul W.; Pastink, Arnoud
作者单位：University of Oxford; Utrecht University
摘要：We study the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria of bimatrix games, in a setting where players initially know their own payoffs but not the other player's. In order to find a solution of reasonable quality, some amount of communication is required. We study algorithms where the communication is substantially less than the size of the game. When the communication is polylogarithmic in the number of strategies, we show how to obtain epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium for epsilon a...
