Intrinsic and instrumental reciprocity: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cabral, Luis; Ozbay, Erkut Y.; Schotter, Andrew
• 署名单位: New York University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; New York University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.001
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 100-121
• 关键词: reciprocity; Indefinitely repeated games; Veto game

摘要

In the context of an indefinitely repeated veto game, we devise an experiment to distinguish between alternative explanations of generous behavior (accepting negative payoffs): altruism, intrinsic backward-looking reciprocity, and instrumental forward-looking reciprocity. Our results are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that observed sacrifices are motivated by equilibrium selfish, forward-looking reciprocal behavior although we find a more subtle way in which past kindness affects behavior. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.