Markets for information: Of inefficient firewalls and efficient monopolies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cabrales, Antonio; Gottardi, Piero
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; European University Institute; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.008
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 24-44
• 关键词: Information sale; cheap talk; Conflicts of interest; information acquisition; firewalls; market efficiency

摘要

In this paper we study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is also useful to potential competitors. Agents may sell, or buy, reports over the information acquired and choose their trades in the market on the basis of what they learnt. Reports are unverifiable - cheap talk messages - hence the quality of the information transmitted depends on the conflicts of interest faced by the senders. We find that, when information has a prevalent horizontal differentiation component, in equilibrium information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold, though reports are typically noisy. The market for information is in most cases a monopoly, and there is underinvestment in information acquisition. We also show that regulatory interventions, in the form of firewalls, only make the inefficiency worse. Efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information, provided entry is blocked. Crown Copyright (C) 2013 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.