Strategic complexity in repeated extensive games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Muto, Nozomu
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.007
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 45-52
• 关键词: Strategic complexity; Finite automaton; Repeated game; Extensive game; prisoner's dilemma; Multiple complexity

摘要

This paper studies a machine (finite automaton) playing a two-player repeated game of a simple extensive-form game with perfect information. We introduce a new complexity measure called multiple complexity which incorporates a strategy's responsiveness to information in the stage game as well as the number of states of the machine. We completely characterize the Nash equilibrium of the machine game. In the sequential-move prisoner's dilemma, cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.