-
作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; Zeng, Huaxia
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：A domain of preference orderings is a random dictatorship domain if every strategy-proof random social choice function satisfying unanimity defined on the domain is a random dictatorship. Gibbard (1977) showed that the universal domain is a random dictatorship domain. We ask whether an arbitrary dictatorial domain is a random dictatorship domain and show that the answer is negative by constructing dictatorial domains that admit anonymous, unanimous, strategy-proof random social choice function...
-
作者：Bach, Christian W.; Tsakas, Elias
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), but also the subsequent generalization by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All...
-
作者：Grant, Simon; Kline, J. Jude; Quiggin, John
作者单位：University of Queensland
摘要：We consider the optimality of liquidated damages contracts in a setting of contractual ambiguity and potential for disputes. We show that when parties are ambiguity averse enough, they will optimally choose liquidated damages contracts and sacrifice risk sharing opportunities. (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
-
作者：Azevedo, Eduardo M.
摘要：This paper considers a simple equilibrium model of an imperfectly competitive two-sided matching market. Firms and workers may have heterogeneous preferences over matches on the other side, and the model allows for both uniform and personalized wages or contracts. To make the model tractable, I use the Azevedo and Leshno (2013) framework, in which a finite number of firms is matched to a continuum of workers. In equilibrium, even if wages are exogenous and fixed, firms have incentives to strat...
-
作者：Aramendia, Miguel; Wen, Quan
作者单位：University of Basque Country; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：In repeated games, subgame perfection requires all continuation strategy profiles must be effective to enforce the equilibrium; they serve as punishments should deviations occur. It does not require whether a punishment can be justified for the deviation, which creates a great deal of freedom in constructing equilibrium strategies, resulting the well-known folk theorem. We introduce justifiable punishments in repeated games. After one player deviates, the corresponding continuation or punishme...
-
作者：Hu, Tai-Wei
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Unpredictable behavior is central to optimal play in many strategic situations because predictable patterns leave players vulnerable to exploitation. A theory of unpredictable behavior based on differential complexity constraints is presented in the context of repeated two-person zero-sum games. Each player's complexity constraint is represented by an endowed oracle and a strategy is feasible if it can be implemented with an oracle machine using that oracle. When one player's oracle is suffici...
-
作者：Peck, James
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Potential manipulation of prices and convergence to rational expectations equilibrium is studied in a game without noise traders. Informed players with initially long and short positions (bulls and bears) seek to manipulate consumer expectations in opposite directions. In equilibrium, period 1 prices reveal the state, so manipulation is unsuccessful. Bears and uninformed consumers sell up to their short-sale limits in period 1. Bulls buy in period 1 but receive arbitrage losses. When the numbe...
-
作者：Gayer, Gabrielle; Gilboa, Itzhak
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider the dynamics of reasoning by general rules (theories) and by specific cases (analogies). When an agent faces an exogenous process, we show that, under mild conditions, if reality happens to be simple, the agent will converge to adopt a theory and discard analogical thinking. If, however, reality is complex, analogical reasoning is unlikely to disappear. By contrast, when the agent is a player in a large population coordination game, and the process is generated by all players' pred...
-
作者：Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier; Holden, Richard
作者单位：Columbia University; Paris School of Economics; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Universite Catholique Louvain; University of Southern Denmark
摘要：We consider the problem of assigning agents to slots on a line, where only one agent can be served at a slot and each agent prefers to be served as close as possible to his target. Our focus is on aggregate gap minimizing methods, i.e., those that minimize the total gap between targets and assigned slots. We first consider deterministic assignment of agents to slots, and provide a direct method for testing if a given deterministic assignment is aggregate gap minimizing. We then consider probab...
