The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brown, Alexander L.; Velez, Rodrigo A.
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.008
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 115-131
• 关键词: Experimental economics; No-envy; Divide-and-choose; Winner's-bid auction; Behavioral mechanism design

摘要

In experimental partnership dissolution problems with complete information, the divide and-choose mechanism is significantly superior to the winner's-bid auction. The performance of divide-and-choose is mainly affected by reciprocity issues and not by bounded rationality. The performance of the winner's-bid auction is significantly affected by bounded rationality. Contrary to theoretical predictions divide-and-choose exhibits no first mover bias. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.