Complementary institutions and economic development: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kloosterman, Andrew; Schotter, Andrew
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.001
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 186-205
• 关键词: Economic development; dynamic games; institutions

摘要

This paper considers the problem of why societies develop differently, a question most recently articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). We follow North (1990) in defining institutions as the rules of the game in society. The question then becomes why do some societies develop functional institutions while others do not? To investigate this question, we develop and examine a specific type of dynamic game (which we call an Institutional Game). Our point is that complementarities among the choices that all societies make as they develop can help to answer this question. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.